Ibn Khaldun and his followers viewed the cycles of asabiyyah as the key reason for the emergence, growth, and decline of states. Although the term translates to "collective solidarity," it does not fully capture its essence, as it pertains to groups of people who have seized power.
An example of steppe asabiyyah is the 26 companions of Genghis Khan, who became the founders of the largest empire in history, which lasted six centuries until the collapse of the Kazakh Khanate in the 19th century. This strength and spirit of unity allowed them to withstand the test of time.
As Ibn Khaldun predicted, Genghis Khan's empire ultimately fell apart due to internal conflicts, a phenomenon also observed in other major states. Analyzing Arab monarchies, Ibn Khaldun developed the theory of asabiyyah, which remains relevant today as it is based on the unchanging nature of humanity.
Researchers believe that asabiyyah represents a heightened consciousness of unity based on tribal and kinship ties, leading to social solidarity and group identity. This concept intersects with Lev Gumilev's idea of passionarity.
By early 1917, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were a small political faction, but by the end of the year, they had staged a coup, appealing to the dispossessed masses with slogans promising them land and peace. However, with the end of the civil war and Lenin's declining health, a power struggle began within the Bolsheviks.
Ibn Khaldun noted that the weakening of asabiyyah occurs when a new leader seeks to monopolize power, leading to internal conflicts. Stalin, realizing this, created a party apparatus as a tool of control, which resulted in the destruction of the ideals of the revolution and the replacement of special solidarity with bureaucracy.
Interestingly, Cuban leaders, after their revolution, allowed Che Guevara to continue fighting in Latin America, wishing to avoid his influence on domestic politics.
Thus, the question arises about the relationship between special solidarity and power institutions. In the USSR, party power dominated until 1991; however, this does not mean that asabiyyah disappeared. It manifested in intra-party struggles and leadership changes. Modern examples from China and Vietnam demonstrate the presence of party asabiyyah, which has adapted to contemporary conditions.
Trump's team can also be described as asabiyyah, as it sought power with a clear goal, despite the need to interact with established institutions. Unlike Arab dynasties, the White House operates within the framework of democratic principles and laws.
In Russia, according to popular blogger Savromat, "Chekist asabiyyah" dominates, characterized by the fact that its leader Putin came to power as a successor rather than through conflict. Putin's asabiyyah controls all state institutions, hiding its influence behind their facade, unlike the more open system in the USA.
Political science has many terms for analyzing processes; however, the concept of asabiyyah reveals the hidden mechanisms of political events, considering both ideological and human aspects. This concept is useful for a deep understanding of political dynamics.
Ibn Khaldun studied Arab monarchies without any notion of democratic institutions that emerged in Europe. But it can be argued that where democratic institutions are strong, asabiyyah manifests itself weaker, and vice versa. These negative associations with asabiyyah are mainly linked to its manifestations in authoritarian systems.
It is important to note that special solidarity does not disappear, as it reflects people's commitment to a certain power. This must be taken into account when analyzing the modern history of Kazakhstan, where Nursultan Nazarbayev became the founder of a new statehood, gaining power through the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and then legitimizing it through elections. Around him, a group of like-minded individuals formed, often from the lower ranks, to avoid ambitious conflicts.
As Ibn Khaldun noted, new leaders strive to monopolize power, which Nazarbayev succeeded in, as the dissolution of the CPSU left many competitors without status. However, he also needed to take control of the economy, replacing "red directors" with his people.
Although the field for competition was cleared, free elections led to the emergence of ambitious deputies who did not support the concentration of power. But Nazarbayev acted by dissolving the Supreme Council and in 1995 adopted a new Constitution granting him super-presidential powers.
Why can the first presidential community be called asabiyyah? Firstly, it is a unity based on the ideas of independence and building a strong state, which was important for the members of asabiyyah. Secondly, blood ties played an important role, as seen in the example of Rakhat Aliyev and his impunity.
The emergence of the "Young Turks" marked an important ideological rift in the ruling elite, as they realized that excessive concentration of power could lead to negative consequences. In a moment of crisis, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proved to be a loyal ally of Nazarbayev, which influenced his choice of successor.
Members of asabiyyah often do not think about the justice of the group's actions, supporting it regardless of the circumstances. This leads to decisions that do not consider the interests of the population, as seen in the case of privatization or land reform.
Furthermore, the ruling group's desire for wealth and luxury becomes a sign of status and power. This leads to resource depletion and inefficiency in governance. Ibn Khaldun emphasized that the growth of the nobility can lead to uprisings and economic problems.
Another sign is the shift from ideological motivation to careerism, which leads to the hierarchization of the power system. The loss of high goals results in a diminished ability to respond to the challenges of the time.
The weakening ruling group demonstrates strength through monumental projects, but in Kazakhstan, special solidarity existed as a hidden power making important decisions that were then formalized through state institutions.
Ibn Khaldun noted that there can be continuity between declining and new dynasties. Institutions can be renewed if the strength of asabiyyah is preserved. The change of power is often associated with positive changes, as we see in the examples of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The question of how to characterize the Kazakh power transition in terms of asabiyyah remains relevant. Tokayev's asabiyyah has replaced Nazarbayev's, and the clash of the two forces became evident during the January events.
It is important to change the nature of the ruling asabiyyah, which is related to key ideas that must be progressive. After Kantary, Tokayev made statements about breaking with the past and building a New Kazakhstan, introducing new ideologies and renewing personnel.
However, it is crucial that the new asabiyyah strives for real changes, not just the preservation of old orders. The leader must keep it from excessive pursuit of material goods, as this stratum controls the budget and investments.
Nevertheless, problems are observed at the top of power. The intensification of issues concerning 2029 shows that the future will be decided not through democratic procedures but according to the laws of asabiyyah. This implies conflicts and unpredictability.
Therefore, it is necessary to correct the imbalance towards asabiyyah, which can be done by strengthening state and public institutions and political modernization with a democratic inclination.
One scenario could be Tokayev's return to political leadership in the Amanat party, developing a new ideological platform and strategy aimed at reforms in electoral law, the judicial system, and local self-government, which could be aligned with new key changes in the Constitution.
High goals and ideological unity can unite a new progressive asabiyyah and provide it with long-term support from society.
Erlan Baizhanov
diplomat, journalist
