This problem is a consequence of institutional shortcomings and geographical fragmentation.
Historians point out that the issue of differences between the north and south of Kyrgyzstan became relevant only during the Soviet period. Previously, Kyrgyz people were not divided into northerners and southerners, as they were under the rule of various states — the Kokand Khanate, the Bukhara Emirate, as well as the Russian and Chinese empires. With the formation of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, which marked the beginning of a unified Kyrgyzstan, the process of dividing the country into north and south began. This led to the resettlement of people: southern personnel were sent to the north, while northern personnel went to the south. The Bolsheviks, aiming to weaken the power of the manaps, began relocating southern manaps to the north and northern manaps to the south. Finding themselves in a new social environment, manaps lost their influence and power, yielding control to the Bolsheviks. This strategy, aimed at mixing the population to prevent tribalism, remains relevant to this day; however, the true reasons for the division lie in the unfinished process of forming the Kyrgyz nation, which was not completed even during the construction of socialism.
Today, the division of Kyrgyzstan into "North" and "South" continues to be one of the most discussed topics in the socio-political context. This is not a simple geographical problem, but a complex socio-political phenomenon that has influenced personnel appointments, resource distribution, and everyday relationships among citizens for decades. Unlike interethnic conflicts, the conflict between "northerners" and "southerners" is a manifestation of intra-ethnic localism, not enmity, but rather a result of institutional failures and geographical fragmentation.
The first question concerns the nature of this phenomenon: why has localism become a "protective mechanism" for the Kyrgyz?
To find solutions, it is necessary to avoid moralizing about regional elites and to recognize the functionality of localism. In the context of weak state institutions in the 1990s and 2000s, regional ties became the only functioning social lift and means of survival. An official from one's home region was perceived not as a corrupt individual, but as a protector capable of providing necessary resources for their circle.
The key idea here is that localism is a "protective mechanism" that activates in conditions where the state fails to perform its functions. With the restoration of the impartiality of state institutions, the need for "regional support" disappears.
The second question is: what is the strategy for "healing" this problem? This requires a transition from slogans to real actions and competencies.
Experts propose a pragmatic approach, far from populism. The solution lies in creating conditions under which regional identity loses its political and economic significance, preventing personnel appointments based on regional origin, which was characteristic of the Soviet past and the period of gaining independence.
a) It is necessary to create infrastructure that will connect the nation. For example, building an alternative "North-South" road and new railway routes is not only about logistics but also the foundation for psychological integration. A direct physical connection between regions breaks down "mental barriers." Reducing travel time between Bishkek and Osh, lowering transportation costs will lead to an increase in interregional marriages, trade, and tourism, helping people perceive each other as closer.
b) Economic decentralization and the abandonment of the "Bishkek pie."
Concentrating resources in one place (for example, the Chui Valley) intensifies competition. Developing regions such as Batken, Talas, and Naryn will reduce pressure on the capital and relieve elites of the need to demand "compensations" for a lack of resources. Creating jobs in the regions will decrease internal migration and reduce everyday tensions in large cities.
c) Reforming personnel policy. Transitioning to meritocracy (the rule of the best).
Replacing the principle of localism with the principle of competence is crucial. As long as public service is perceived as a way to "provide for one's own," the country will continue to fracture. Introducing transparent competitive procedures based on personal merits will gradually reduce the significance of the question "who are you from?" When professionals, not clan representatives, occupy key positions, citizens will lose their sense of regional injustice.
The third aspect is the need to define a time horizon.
In response to the question of how long to wait for localist sentiments to disappear, the experience of other countries provides an honest and realistic answer: localism will never completely disappear (just like in any other country), but its acute stage can be overcome within 20–40 years (one to two generations).
· A change of elites is necessary. The political class that has grown up in independent Kyrgyzstan and is integrated into global processes is less inclined to use "regional cards." For modern businessmen and IT specialists, clan divisions are a burden.
· The process of urbanization is actively continuing, and large cities like Bishkek are becoming natural neutralizers. The children of migrants, studying together and working in the same companies, are forming a new supra-regional identity.
The fourth aspect is demythologization and the creation of a unified cultural code.
Debunking the myth of "different peoples" is extremely important. The cultural, linguistic, and religious unity of Kyrgyzstanis constitutes about 95%. Differences in dialects or culinary preferences should become subjects of cultural exchange, not division.
Here, domestic tourism and a shared information space play an important role. When southerners go to Issyk-Kul, and northerners to the walnut forests of Arslanbob, the regions will cease to be perceived as alien.
In conclusion, the "North-South" problem in Kyrgyzstan will not be resolved through bans and slogans, but through the creation of powerful connecting mechanisms: transport arteries, fair economic lifts, and impartial state institutions. The state must guarantee equality for all, and then the need for "one's own" will disappear on its own. The only question is the political will of the elites to start this process, rather than to parasitize on regional division indefinitely.
Ilyas Kurmanov, Doctor of Political Science
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